INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a growing number of studies have examined the process with which armed groups have transformed into political parties (hereafter 'former rebel parties') and joined electoral politics. While important advances have also been made with regard to whether the shift from 'bullets to ballots' has installed in parties more democratic -or 'moderate' -attitudes (Berti 2013 , Manning 2008 , Whiting 2016 , substantially less attention has been given to party branding and ideological change. As highlighted by Curtis and Sindre (this issue), many armed groups' ideological visions were founded upon exclusive, often ethnically defined, forms of statehood.
What happens to these ideologies when the armed struggle is over and they become multi-party contenders? A pressing question is whether former rebel parties adopt more inclusive and less divisive ideologies and profiles. How, if at all, do they relate to the broader discourse of peacebuilding that permeates the political context in which they mobilize after war has ended? 2 This article addresses this question through a qualitative analysis of changes in expressed ideologies in a subset of former rebel parties, namely secessionist rebel groups turned regionalist political parties. Three such parties have been selected for the purpose of this study: the Aceh Party in Indonesia's Aceh province, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in Sri Lanka, and the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosnia Herzegovina.
These parties provide an interesting lens through which to assess the extent that former rebel parties adopt more inclusive ideological profiles. Their emphasis on ethno-territorial identities as the basis for their struggle is a core feature of their ideology suggesting reliance on exclusionary ideals and a restrictive interpretation of the ethnic community. However, as most conflicts over self-determination rarely end with the manifestation of new states, most former secessionist movements continue to mobilise as political parties in regional or national level politics or both after war has ended. While some movements, such as the Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland have retained their goal of seeking secession, the majority of such parties have formally abandoned their goal of independence, as exemplified by the multiple wartime contenders in the civil war in the former Yugoslavia and most secessionist conflicts in South and Southeast Asia.
2 As has been suggested elsewhere, the shift from propagating a secessionist ideology to endorsing regionalism suggests a weakening in the saliency of the main conflict cleavages, namely the relationship between the region and the state and between the ethnic minority and majority communities (Massetti and Schakel 2016, 60; Sindre 2018) . But to what extent is this shift in the overarching goal of the movements accompanied by a transition towards more inclusive ideologies?
Through a qualitative content analysis of party manifestos and related documents collected during fieldwork in the three contexts, this article develops and presents an analytical framework for assessing the extent to which parties have adapted their ideological profiles. It proposes two dimensions that capture the saliency of the main conflict cleavage and new issues that have come about as a result of transitions to peace. First, to what extent have the parties adapted on core conflict cleavage issues? Second, how do they relate to broader peacebuilding issues? The 3 framework serves two purposes. First, by moving beyond the conventional dichotomy of assessing whether parties have abandoned their radical goals, this framework proposes a more fine-grained understanding of party ideology that takes into account how they incorporate new perspectives brought about by their experience as wartime contenders and as stakeholders to peace. Offering a disaggregated, context sensitive framework, the study provides a new theoretical tool that captures the extent to which the parties have moderated along core dimensions to be able to assess whether these parties contribute to breaking down or upholding conflict cleavages. A typology such as this provides a useful point of departure for a comparative analysis of parties' ideological adaptation across contexts. Second, the study also contributes to our understanding of how these parties act as mobilizers, policy makers and rulers. While the parties discussed here have abandoned their goal of secession, they differ in how they relate to conflict cleavage issues and which new issues they chose to include.
One underlying rationale here is that it is reasonable to expect that the extent to which former rebel parties adopt more inclusive policy stands, discourse and behaviour is essential for how parties relate to, and thereby impact on, the broader processes of peacebuilding.
The article proceeds as follows. First, it develops and explains the new analytical framework and typology that serves the purpose of capturing relevant ideological change. It then briefly discusses the methodology including logic of case selection before turning to each case. The conclusion draws out some comparative findings and identifies future avenues for research.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: DISAGGREGATING ETHNO-NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES IN THE POST-WAR CONTEXT
This section specifies the two dimensions, the conflict cleavage dimension and peacebuilding dimension with corresponding issues. Drawing mainly on insights form literature on ethnic parties and party change, the framework serves an analytical purpose of disaggregating the issue dimensions that capture issues of concern to ethno-nationalist rebel groups and parties.
Conflict cleavage dimension 4
Conflict scholars have long highlighted the potential detrimental effect that ethnic parties may have on political stability in divided societies (Reilly and Nordlund 2008 , Horowitz 1985 , Rabushka and Shepsle 1972 , while the consociational school found that in divided societies, inclusion of ethnic parties may decrease conflicts by way enhancing representation thus curbing radicalization of demands (Lijphart 1977) . The potential stabilising effect of inclusion has been reiterated in recent contributions that demonstrate that rebel group inclusion impacts positively on political stability (Marshall and Ishiyama 2016 ) with more nuance added by Ishiyama and Breuning (2011) who demonstrate that conflict occurrence in ethnically divided society is dependent on the type of ethnic parties involved highlighting variation in the degree of ethnic radicalism.
To date, most studies that assess radicalism within secessionist parties have focused on their stated goal as the degree of self-government (e.g. De Winter 1998) .
Agreeing with Ishiyama and Breuning (2011, 226) and Massetti and Schakel (2016, 60-1) , this study suggests that this reliance on binary typologies is problematic as they render the parties' ideology positions static, while in reality ethnic parties, as any other party, will adapt their positions over time in response to a number of external and internal factors (Harmel and Janda 1994, Panebianco 1988) . The conflict cleavage dimension therefore includes two sets of issues that are the most distinctive features of the ideological foundations of armed secessionist movements (Massetti 2009 ):
Territorial autonomy and ethnic differentiation.
These issues will feature prominently as part of the ideology of ethnonationalist parties anywhere, but in post-war contexts the saliency of these issues in the parties' discourse and profile potentially give an indication as to the extent to which the parties have reinvented themselves and adopted less hostile issue profiles.
Importantly, the aspiration for secessionism and regionalism indicates quite different parameters for political citizenship. Secessionist movements tend to aspire to establish exclusive citizenship based on mono-ethnic identity, while regionalist parties will accept, as a minimum, the multi-ethnic parameters of the state. As demands for territorial sovereignty and commitments to electoral democracy are not mutually exclusive, it is not a prerequisite that secessionist groups abandon their radical secessionism as a goal for a peace settlement to come into effect or, indeed, for groups to be considered 'moderate' (Whiting: 2016) . That said, as has been 5 suggested elsewhere (Whiting 2016; Sindre 2018) , it is reasonable to assume that a peace settlement in which armed groups opt to settle without the core issues of the conflict being 'resolved', may prove less stable than in contexts where former rebel groups shifted their position on this dimension towards accepting -or endorsing -a form of autonomy. For instance, to groups such as Sinn Fein, the transition 'from bullets to ballots' reflects the decision to shift the struggle from armed to non-armed mobilization and push for reunification via democratic means at a time when it had become evident that continued armed engagement 'threatened the group's popularity within its constituency and access to political dialogue and, ultimately, political power' (Berti 2013,175 Therefore a minimalist shift is the formal endorsement of regionalism, while a maximalist shift would entail the recognition that the region is a territorial entity within the larger state. Such a maximalist shift could be reflected in how the party approaches core policy issues and in particular development and reconstruction that naturally dominate the national political agenda in the aftermath of war. Do the former rebel parties see development as a joint national project or as a regional/local project? While ethnic parties are expected to promote economic development for their region and ethnic group, recent research has also found that rebel groups in transitional contexts have adopted pluralist attitudes towards how reconstruction funds should be administered and distributed (Mampilly 2009; Sindre 2014; Walsh 2014) . Attention to such specific policy issues can help clarify whether or not they offer a vision for the state in its entirety in parallel to their regionalist ambitions.
The second conflict cleavage issue, ethnic differentiation, concerns whether the party continues to mobilize in opposition to the ethnic majority community associated with the central state. It is a common feature of secessionist groups to justify their existence on the basis of a combination of a remedial right to independent statehood on the basis of a history of oppression, human rights abuse and exclusion 6 from the state resulting in the need for collective mobilization (Caspersen 2008, 241) .
The discourse during ethnic conflicts often justifies the struggle with reference to the collective desire to restore past grandeur or fulfil the dreams of their ancestors with additional emphasis on episodes of oppression such as pogroms and ethnic riots and policies of exclusion (Caspersen 2011) . While an emphasis on the historical distinctiveness of the 'region' and an image of oppression, forms part of the ethos of most ethno-nationalist movements and parties, that these aspects are toned down in the aftermath of war is important for long-term reconciliation. The minimal shift on this issue signifying moderation would therefore be abandoning xenophobic language directed at the 'other' and especially the dominant ethnic group while a maximalist shift would be the full endorsement of a multi-ethnic state.
Peacebuilding dimension
In addition to being armed contenders during war, many rebel groups invest significant resources into the ending of conflicts and transitioning to electoral democracy. 3 The challenge is to substantiate what constitute change in how former rebel parties' adapt their profiles to the context of peace. Attention to the qualitative differentiation of post-war issues sheds light on both processes of ideological adaptation within these parties as well as their relative agency in long-term peacebuilding. Two sets of issues stand out to be of importance: Attitudes towards conflict resolution mechanisms and the extent to which they promote democratic pluralism.
The first set of issues concern how the parties relate to conflict resolution mechanisms. In the literature, the focus has often been on whether former rebels represent constant spoilers or not (de Zeeuw 2008) . While spoiler behaviour may be a rational strategy ahead of the first post-war election when the group is still organized and structured as a militant group, it is a less likely electoral strategy after the demobilization phase is over simply because the party has adapted and invested significant resources into becoming a viable political party (Manning 2008, Manning and Smith 2016) . If the rebel groups failed to achieve their original goal of secession, Democratic pluralism therefore concerns whether parties seek to build alliances and tolerate, or actively promote, pluralism. While this issue is difficult to measure in quantitative terms, the adopted language gives plausible insights into whether they take an active stance on promoting pluralism. The scholarly debate about parties' willingness to moderate in order to be included into formal politics has tended to focus on whether radical parties become democrats or not (e.g. Schwedler
2011, Tezcür 2010).
4 Manning (2008, 141) notes that there is an inherent risk of conflating two separate issues, namely, that of 'creating democratic actors' versus the idea that inclusion leads to changes in the identity of the armed movement. Dudouet and Lundström (2016) consider the degree to which policies remain 'exclusionist' or 'illiberal' while Berti (2013, 7) views 'moderation' as a process of normative adjustment toward demilitarization and acceptance of principles such as plurality, negotiation and bargaining. Importantly, as highlighted by Whiting (2016) and Caspersen (2011) , the linking of sovereignty and democracy in the ideological profile of secessionist movements may suggest that as parties, they should also find consistent ideological sustenance in the supply of a pro-democracy agenda after war.
However, whether this extends to other democratic values such as acceptance of pluralism and compromise may vary across contexts. For instance, whether or not the parties put emphasis on improving inter-ethnic collaboration or indeed explicitly state their desire and intent to collaborate across ethnic boundaries and with national, nonethnic parties would indicate increased attention to pluralism. Therefore, whether or not the parties strategize to recast themselves in a more compromise-oriented and pluralist light is an indication of the extent to which they actively seek to engage in peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities. In this regard, a minimalist change would be adherence to the rules of democracy, which is a given for the type of cases discussed here. A maximalist change would be explicit effort to adopt pluralist attitudes aimed at compromise and collaboration. 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Case selection
While the ideological profiles of the selected political parties are of considerable interest in themselves to assess ideological change and peace-adaptation by ethnonationalist movements after war, a comparison allows for the illustration of the strengths of the theoretical framework across different contexts in order to demonstrate variation in the extent to which parties contribute to upholding or breaking down wartime divisions. The TNA, the SDS and the Aceh Party are selected on the basis that they are all regionalist political parties with backgrounds as armed secessionist movements, having abandoned their goal of separate statehood. The case analysis will show they differ with regard to the extent to which they have moderated along the two dimensions over time, giving support to the usefulness of this framework for capturing nuances in their ideological profiles and explaining why these parties may play different roles as peacebuilders.
There are a number of structural differences between the contexts and parties.
First, the parties differ with regard to organizational legacies, each conducive to potentially different pathways of transformations (Kitschelt, Mansfeldova et al. 1999 ). The third difference concerns the institutional context within which the parties operate from highly centralised in Sri Lanka, partial autonomy in Aceh/Indonesia to a federal mixed system in Bosnia Herzegovina. In Aceh the peace settlement awarded increased autonomy to the province and a strengthened local parliament. The most important provision awarded to GAM in the settlement was, as the only province in Indonesia, the opportunity to establish local political parties. In a similar fashion, in BiH, due to the specific framework of power sharing across the three dominant ethnic groups, the SDS also only seeks a vote share from amongst Serbs living on the Republika Srpska. In Sri Lanka, as the TNA has taken the position as the dominant front for the Tamil nationalist movement, the party continues to work from within the formal political arena. Very few powers have been awarded to the newly established Regional Councils in the Northern and Eastern provinces and hence the party seeks representation at both national and regional levels.
However, despite these structural differences -organizational legacies, conflict ending and institutional context -the logic of mobilization remains fairly similar across the three contexts. Moreover, the parties have undergone similar processes of transformation from demobilizing their armed wings, entering the electoral game, and reorganizing into political parties. Leaders of all parties, including the TNA, were engaged in internationally supported peace talks.
Data
This article deploys qualitative content analysis of party manifestos and related documents to identify the saliency of the issues and issue change along the two dimensions. The study thus follows others in defining the party by how it presents itself publically, as opposed to by whom its supporters are (Chandra and Metz 2002; Ishiyama and Breuning 2011; Ishiyama and Marshall 2017) .
Party programmes reflect the broader lines of the party directions and the 'policy collectively adopted by the party' (Borg 1966, 97) . Qualitative content analysis -as opposed to a quantitative approach -is particularly useful for the present purpose as it allows for consideration of nuances in text with constant attention to the context under study. As party programmes vary in form and length, a qualitative assessment also allows for measuring saliency of one issue relative to other issues within that same text.
Even so, there are some additional methodological challenges that concern the manifestos themselves that merit consideration. One general weakness of this approach is the unspoken aspects of a party's ideology (Pirro 2014) . Former rebel parties may face legal limitations that require attention to specific parameters. Parties may also restrain themselves in order to attract more international support in the form of party assistance or reintegration funds. That said, as Sindre (2014) has argued, party assistance may also lead to more moderate leaders gaining more power within the movement sidelining radical forces. Despite these problems, party manifestos give the most complete picture of how parties seek to represent themselves to the surroundings.
For the purpose of maximising data for each party, this study makes use of all The following analysis does two things: It discusses the presence and saliency of each issue dimension in the three parties and traces any change in the emphasis and content of these issues over time. When an issue is included in the party programme and receives ample space relative to other issues, it is considered a salient issue (see Pirro 2014, 611-12) . Table 2 , which is further discussed in the conclusion, specifies the strength of the issues within the three parties. Before proceeding it is important to stress that the four issue categories that constitute the two dimensions are theoretical When it comes to the saliency of conflict cleavage issues, the Aceh Party has adopted a maximalist position. The party makes active references to its past as an armed movement mobilising around the notions of heroism and sacrifice by the leadership and its combatants (Sindre 2016a) . During the struggle GAM propagated a coherent ideology anchored in nationalist myths of past sovereignty and a prescriptive programme for how that state would be governed according to an Acehnese state code led by a Sultan, a Wali Nanggroe recounted in a series of texts compiled and written by the founding leader, Hasan di Tiro (Kingsbury 2007 ). This discourse was further supported by the claim of a second colonization by the Javanese, which served to reinforce the idea that the Indonesian state was an artificial construct that ensured Javanese dominance at the expense of other regions in the archipelago.
During what is often described as the final phase of the armed conflict, from 1998-2004, this discourse of ethnic differentiation became less dominant and was replaced with an increased emphasis on pluralism and democracy, which in part came about as the result of the strengthening of the political wing and alliance with civil society. 6 Hence, the GAM case illustrates a shift in discourse away from focusing on ethnic differentiation from the 'Javanese dominated Indonesian state' towards emphasising democracy, ethnic pluralism and human rights as a basis of their claim to self-determination already before the signing of the MoU and thereby also before taking part in elections. 7 The emergence of a moderate wing within the movement and the organizational evolution of GAM into a social political movement with a strong civilian base had led to an internal shift in the balance of power towards moderates that pushed for increased regionalism rather than secession. The formal endorsement of 'self-government' and autonomy that also awarded the rebel group with provisions to transform into a political party to ensure its continued political involvement in Aceh's internal affairs was a determinant factor for more radical segments to agree to a compromise solution.
8
Across two election cycles the Aceh Party has presented an outward profile as a regionalist political party that no longer seeks secession. The manifestos and election documents all put emphasis on the region and its relative autonomy vis-à-vis Jakarta. In contrast to the wartime discourse that highlighted the historical myths of past grandeur to undergird the claim to independence, the post-war discourse has shifted towards presenting autonomy and regionalism as an opportunity for ensuring democratisation at the regional level and across Indonesia. 14 tourist industry. Amongst the most radical of these policy propositions was the establishment of an international airport in Aceh that would strengthen ties between Aceh and the rest of Asia without needing to travel via Jakarta. In parliament, however, the Aceh Party did not push for these reforms and soon abandoned any goals of radical transformation of the economy and radical development policies.
Instead, ahead of the 2014 elections, the party increasingly aligned with national parties and abandoned any radical local solutions that deviated from the mainstream emphasis on business propositions in their programmes. Instead, they sought integration into the general Indonesian development programmes drawing closer to national parties and the state.
In abandoning its radical development goals and policies, the party has to some extent reverted to emphasising identity politics as part of its public profile. In contrast to earlier periods, however, identity politics is detached from seeking any form of institutional change or structural transformation, such as demanding increased autonomy. Instead, the emphasis is on cultural norms and regional distinctiveness. This is first and foremost exemplified by the use of identity markers such as Acehnese clothing, the use of titles and rituals that continue to feature prominently at election rallies and party meetings as well as in parliament. To respond to some early criticisms and fears that a GAM party represented only the ethnic Acehnese, excluding other minorities such as Alas and Lues, the party seeks to cast itself as a distinctly regional party representing 'the people of Aceh' (Aceh Party 2014).
The peacebuilding dimension has therefore replaced the focus on the territory and region and is the most prevalent feature of the official party programs and in the discourse. Across the two election cycles, the Aceh Party has capitalised extensively on a discourse as peacemakers and enablers of democracy. The most striking feature has been the framing of the peace settlement as a victorious outcome and the Aceh In the 2014 White Papers, the conflict cleavages resurface in explicit terms as is illustrated by making references to ethnic differences and increased emphasis on sovereignty and a policy of difference:
'Bearing in mind that the unilateral and unconstitutional standpoints of Bosniak and pro-Bosnian representatives, which are directed against the RS, are not individual and isolated cases, but part of a broader strategy that de facto represents a continuation of war policy on a diplomatic plane, the SDS will insist on taking effective responses for the suppression of [such] illegal and illegitimate activities' (SDS 2014, 31).
The evolution can be traced in a shift in tone and emphasis in the programs from (1) defending the existing of the entity (Republika Srpska) and the constitution, 
10
This process of re-radicalization on the core conflict cleavage partially corresponds to the party's move into opposition in 2006. However, re-radicalization must also be understood as taking place in the context of intensified inter-party competition amongst Serb parties in Republika Srpska and a crisis of governance in BiH as a whole (ICG 2012) . The rise of the Alliance for Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and its leader Milorad Dodik, by most described as a hard-line Serb ultra-nationalist, has led to intensified debate over the identity and future direction of the entity and to some extent also increased radicalization and outbidding between the Serbian parties.
Consequently, the peacebuilding dimension, and especially democratic pluralism, has a much less prevalent position place in the contemporary ideological profile of the SDS. While the SDS remains a federalist party that seeks to present an image of fostering democracy, good governance, rule of law and stability inside the Serbian entity, the party has adopted an increasingly ambiguous position in its approach to how to solve the mounting political crisis at the national level. This is in part reflected in the increased focus on internal politics of the entity as it devotes ever more space to criticising the ruling parties and the Serbian presidency. In that regard, the SDS clearly seeks to project an image of the true defenders of stability, progress and democratic accountability for the Serbs in BiH. Therefore, peacebuilding issues remain a salient part of the party's profile, but have decreased in importance vis-à-vis conflict cleavage issues -such as the degree the degree of autonomy awarded to the Republika Srpska and ethnic differentiation vis-à-vis other ethnic groups, especially over the last election cycle.
The Tamil National Alliance (TNA): Strategic moderation and radical ethnonationalism
The ideological profile of the TNA consists of three election manifestos and the so- and 'internal self-determination' (Uyangoda 2010, 253) . In signing the Indo-Lanka Accord, the armed groups that later formed the TNA had supported the establishment of Provincial Councils and devolution of powers.
11 As a unifying nationalist declaration, the Thimpu principles have paved the way for a shift in the nationalist discourse away from secession towards propagating devolution and constitutional reform, respecting the 'territorial integrity of Sri Lanka'
12
The three party manifestos of the TNA produced over a course of fifteen years reflect this inconsistency in the Tamil nationalist approach to the main conflict cleavage issue that concern the degree of self-determination for a Tamil homeland.
There 'Different countries have fashioned different systems of governments to ensure these principles [i.e. the Thimpu principles]. We have demanded and struggled for an independent Tamil state as the answer to this problem arising out of the denial of these basic rights of our people...In view of our earnest desire for peace, we are prepared to give consideration to any set of proposals in keeping with the above principles that the Sri Lanka government might place before us ' (TNA 2001, 3) . When it comes to the peacebuilding issues and especially commitment to democratic pluralism, the Tamil nationalist discourse propagated by the TNA stresses the links between self-determination and democratic pluralism. The collapse of the LTTE enabled the TNA to take control of the discourse over what constitutes sovereignty, which previously has been narrowly defined as an independence project and a state-building project. From this, there are several elements in the contemporary political discourse that indicate strategic moderation and acceptance of more pluralistic attitudes when it comes to intra-ethnic collaboration and strategic alliance building across the main ethnic divides that speaks directly to reaffirming peacebuilding issues as a salient feature of the party's ideological profile. First, there has been a significant shift in the formal party discourse with regard to minority rights and political inclusion, especially in its approach to the country's Tamil Second, the TNA is strategically selective when it comes to alliance building and seeking coalitions. Ahead of the 2015 presidential elections, the TNA formally supported opposition candidate Sirisena's peace platform. As Sirisena formed a national unity government, the TNA opted out on the premise that although they supported Sirisena's policies for political reform, they would remain in opposition until a political solution had been found that addresses Tamil grievances: 'We will first have to reach an agreement on various issues, including the human rights concerns. Only if the government can reach a solution to the Tamil issue, will we consider joining the proposed national government. focused on changes in goals or adaptation to democracy, this study argues that attention to party issue profiles give better and more precise insights into whether and how parties adapt after war and that this is important for assessing how parties contribute positively or negatively to forging peace. The article thus proposes an analytical framework to capture decrease in the saliency of conflict cleavage issues and increase in saliency of peacebuilding issues that is context sensitive and serves to capture internal variation in how these parties adapt and rebrand their profiles over multiple election cycles.
As summarised in Table 2 is not determinant for how they mobilize as parties after war. This is further reflected in the issue of democratic pluralism. While all three parties recast the nationalist discourse in more civic terms emphasising inclusiveness, pluralism and tolerance within and between the ethnic blocs, the extent to which we can trace change across the three parties differs. The SDS calls for cooperation within the Republika Srpska, but reverts to a divisive language when referring to the Bosnian state. The TNA calls for cooperation and seeks to build coalitions at the regional level, but this is also combined with the continued use of a language of ethnic differentiation. These contradictions further illustrate that on the one hand, the former rebel parties balance on a tight rope between seeking legitimacy based on wartime cleavages highlighting sacrifice and oppression, while on the other hand presenting themselves as protectors of peace in support of pluralism and inter-ethnic cooperation.
Although ethno-nationalist parties in post-war contexts share many traits with other ethno-nationalist parties in non-civil war affected contexts, the experience of armed mobilization, peacebuilding and recovery, creates a particular context to which these parties adapt. As a first systematic study of ideological change in former rebel parties over multiple election cycles, this study has shown that although these parties do not undergo fundamental identity change as such, they adapt and moderate their ideologies and programmatic profiles, but to different degrees. The study opens up further avenues for research into how former rebel parties impact on peacebuilding and democratization in post-civil war states. Due to its flexibility the typology also provides a framework for comparative analysis across different types of rebel groups beyond the ethno-regionalist context discussed here. 
